Summary

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 has wreaked devastation on the civilian population, causing immense suffering. Russian forces have committed numerous apparent war crimes and crimes against humanity in Ukraine. As of November 2024, the Ukrainian government had registered 147, 559 alleged war crimes and other abuses, and Russia exercised control over swaths of Ukrainian territory, including parts of Luhanska, Donetska, Zaporizka, and Khersonska regions, as well as the entire Crimean Peninsula, which Russia occupied in 2014.

Trapped behind the frontline are millions of Ukrainian citizens who must daily contend with bombardment and shifting battlelines, predation by their occupiers, wartime deprivation, and often split up families and households.

Many Ukrainians are no longer behind enemy lines, after the areas where they live were de-occupied, but they endured other hardships that have lasted long after Russian occupation ended.

***

The experience of Veronika V. (pseudonym), a 50-year-old child psychologist with almost 30 years of experience, illustrates some of these hardships. Veronika lives in a city in Kharkivska region. By April 2022, after intense fighting, Russian forces occupied Veronika’s city, and it remained under occupation until late September that year. 

Like many other residents, Veronika spent the first month of the occupation at home, the constant shelling leaving her too terrified to venture outside. By mid-June, she decided she was ready to help her community. She resumed her work at a local kindergarten, where she and other staff cleaned up the building before it could reopen, sweeping out glass and rubble and shaking out mattresses. Due to ongoing hostilities, the kindergarten remained closed to children. Staff who continued working received humanitarian aid weekly from Russian occupying authorities and volunteers.

Veronika was a well-known psychologist, and soon residents began seeking her support. She said that she started providing counseling to a group of approximately 10 women, all local residents:

People’s need [for psychological help] was huge. Everyone was terrified. For two months, people lived in their basements, afraid to go outside. And when they could meet for a group session, talk about their emotions …it was so important.

At the request of the local education department, now under the control of Russian occupying authorities, Veronika was then asked to write an article for a local newspaper on how to best support children emotionally during the war. The article, published under her name, offered practical advice on helping children cope with the stress. She said:

It was a professional article. Not screaming about how well we had it under occupation but focused on how to support children under such traumatic, unstable circumstances. It talked about things like having a routine, taking children for walks when possible, keeping a schedule.

In September, after an almost six-month Russian occupation, Ukrainian forces liberated the city. Like other residents, Veronika had to undergo “filtration,” a screening process by Ukrainian security services. Although they cleared her of all suspicion of collaboration with Russian forces, local authorities made it clear to Veronika she would never work with the local education department again. A local official specifically mentioned her article as the reason, she said.

Veronika started looking for a new job. Despite applying for several positions, including at four charity foundations, she was unable to find employment as a psychologist in her home city. The head of one of the foundations, which hired Veronika initially and then was forced to fire her, told Human Rights Watch that the municipal authorities had explicitly prohibited the foundation from hiring Veronika:

They told us, if [the foundation] wants to be able to work … to rent office space, even for money, you can’t hire her [because she is a “collaborator.”] [They said], “Remember, you either work with us or you are against us.”

Veronika said that she was shocked by what she had to face after her city was de-occupied. She said that she was proud of her work under occupation and had stayed to help her city and other Ukrainians. She questioned her own naivety and wondered if she should have hidden her work.

Another resident from Veronika’s city said: “People who stayed and worked under occupation have become unemployable. They can’t even get a job as a street sweeper now.”

Veronika's story is only one example of the many unjust experiences of Ukrainian civilians caught in the crossfire of Russia’s war in Ukraine. While she has not been criminally prosecuted, many others, who engaged with occupying authorities to no greater extent than she did, have been.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Ukrainian authorities have prosecuted hundreds of Ukrainian civilians, sentencing some to lengthy prison terms, on charges of “acts of collaboration” under overly vague and broad anti-collaboration legislation that Ukraine's parliament adopted in March 2022, two weeks after the invasion. More than 8,400 investigations have been opened since then.

Intended to deter collaboration with occupying forces, the practical impact of the legislation goes much further. In effect, it criminalizes Ukrainian civilians who provide routine public services to their fellow Ukrainians, as they are expected to do under occupation. The broad range of activities and interactions with the occupier that fall under the legislation in practice make it very difficult for Ukrainians employed in public service before their towns were occupied or who wanted to assist with delivery of public services afterward, to avoid falling afoul of the legislation.

The penalties set out for different types of so-called acts of collaboration range from bans on working in certain professions or public service for up to 15 years, corrective labor and asset seizure, to life imprisonment.

***

This report analyzes Ukraine’s anti-collaboration laws and their impact on a range of rights. It highlights how some anti-collaboration provisions criminalize legitimate civilian activities under occupation. It also outlines cases of arbitrary prosecutions and penalties against Ukrainian civilians and describes how authorities have at times used these laws to penalize the mere act of continuing to work under Russian occupation, without adequate regard to establishing the accused’ intent to undermine Ukraine’s security or demonstrate that actual damage was inflicted as a result their actions. It also looks at the broader consequences of these laws and their implementation on communities emerging from occupation.

The collaboration prosecutions documented in this report involved people from de-occupied areas of Ukraine. Ukrainian authorities have also prosecuted individuals who are currently living in occupied territories, trying them in absentia.

This report documents cases of Ukrainian citizens, including volunteers, municipal workers, medical personnel, and teachers, who were prosecuted for actions that had no criminal content and caused no public harm. Yet they suffered harsh, arbitrary penalties for alleged collaboration with occupying forces. For instance, in one documented case, a veterinarian was sentenced, in absentia, to 10 years in prison for accepting an administrative role in the local veterinary service, while an electrician who took part in the efforts to restore electrical supply to a city, damaged by hostilities, was handed a three-year prison term, accompanied by confiscation of property and a professional ban of 10 years. Although an appellate court issued a more lenient sentence, it did not exonerate the man or expunge his criminal record.

The Ukrainian government is within its rights to adopt legislation to punish those who pose a threat to national security under occupation. Such measures may be necessary to respond to public calls for justice and prevent a sense of impunity in society. However, as this report describes, the current anti-collaboration legal framework is deeply flawed. Its language is imprecise, overly broad and vague. It casts too wide a net, capturing not only those who actively harm Ukraine’s safety and security, but also civilians carrying out ordinary work for fellow civilians under occupation or performing other activities necessary for survival.

International human rights law requires that legislation meets the criteria of “legality,” which means that to be valid, laws cannot be overly broad or vague. Instead, they need to be sufficiently accessible and precise so that an individual can reasonably foresee the consequences of their actions, in particular when they may be in violation of the law.

Ukraine’s international legal obligations also require it to ensure due process and fair trial rights, with due consideration afforded to duress or coercive circumstances, equal application of the law, and proportionate punishment. Ukraine’s anti-collaboration laws do not meet these tests. The fact that courts have issued different verdicts for similar acts, and identical verdicts for very different acts and seemingly very different levels of culpability under a given provision of the criminal code, is a demonstration of the legislation’s arbitrariness and the lack of foreseeability.

Analysis by Human Rights Watch and other organizations of existing court verdicts shows that the conviction rate in collaboration cases is close to 100 percent. This, combined with the prevalence of plea bargains, the low rate of appeals, and the scarcity of lawyers willing to handle collaboration cases raises significant concerns about whether individuals charged with collaboration have adequate access to due process. Many collaboration prosecutions are also conducted in absentia, but without meeting any of the due process safeguards required to render those proceedings fair under international law.

Ukrainian legal experts and human rights defenders interviewed by Human Rights Watch for this report mostly criticized the anti-collaboration laws. Many believed them to be unfair and unjust, and thought that they punish people for simply trying to survive under difficult circumstances. Some argued that the Ukrainian government should be encouraging people to stay in their communities and provide Ukrainian civilians with services under occupation, rather than punishing them for doing so.

The anti-collaboration legislation does not sufficiently address the coercion and duress that civilians face under occupation. The report describes how the legislation enables the courts to unfairly punish civilians who were forced to engage with Russian occupying authorities to protect themselves and their families. To address this, prosecutors and courts should in each case carefully review and consider individual circumstances, such as evidence of intimidation, pressure, or threats of violence.

In May 2024, the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine took an important step by issuing a directive to the heads of regional prosecutor’s offices, instructing them to comply with international human rights law and international humanitarian law during pre-trial investigations and providing procedural guidance in criminal cases involving collaboration. The instruction, which the Prosecutor General’s office shared with Human Rights Watch, re-iterated the prevalence of international human rights and humanitarian law over domestic law. Recognizing that Ukraine’s collaboration laws do not explicitly differentiate between criminal collaboration and necessary interactions with the occupying power, the letter instructs the prosecutors to apply practical considerations to make this distinction.

While this is a positive move, at time of writing, the extent of the impact of these instructions on new and ongoing investigations and prosecutions or previously issued verdicts remains unclear.

***

In some cases, described in this report, local authorities returning to de-occupied areas have targeted residents even after they underwent “filtration” and were cleared of any suspicion of violating anti-collaboration laws. Like Veronika, described above, these residents can then be targeted by local authorities who publicly signal that they will not be able to get a job again because during the occupation they did not leave and continued to work. Official policy does not condone this, but as a Ukrainian Supreme Court judge critical of the law told Human Rights Watch: “To put it simply, they are being punished for not fleeing their homes.”

A woman whose city was occupied between April and September 2022 summarized her experience:

Our mayor left just before the Russians came in. He didn’t help us, didn’t tell us to evacuate. He just ran away, quietly, took his family out. And then when our [Ukrainian forces] liberated us, the mayor suddenly reappeared. He said that all of us who stayed behind and worked are collaborators. People started … asking: what were we supposed to do to feed our families? And he responded: “You were supposed to eat worms [rather than collaborate with the Russians.]”

Nearly three years after the shock of the Russia’s full-scale invasion and the rushed passage of the anti-collaboration laws, some Ukrainian legislators are rethinking their impact and proposing amendments. Ukrainians we spoke with said the current anti-collaboration laws are counterproductive in that they effectively encourage Ukrainians to abandon occupied communities, while incentivizing those who remain, whatever their sympathies, to fear rather than welcome Ukrainian authorities after de-occupation. This, they argue, has made Ukrainian recovery of its territorial integrity and reintegration of liberated populations more difficult.

As detailed below, many in Ukraine’s civil society believe that prosecuting individuals for collaboration should be considered through the broader lens of transitional justice, with a careful balance between Ukraine’s immediate security needs, the humanitarian needs of Ukrainian civilians, and the long-term interests of Ukraine in recovering and reintegrating Russian occupied territories.

Recommendations

To the Ukrainian Authorities:

• Revise the anti-collaboration legislation, in close consultation with civil society, to ensure compliance with the norms and standards of international humanitarian law and international human rights law. This should include explicit provisions making clear that collaboration does not include the continued provision of routine services to civilians under occupation.

• Revise the anti-collaboration legislation to prevent the unjust targeting and punishing of civilians who engaged with Russian occupiers under situations of coercion or duress, to protect themselves and their families. Issue clear guidelines and provide appropriate training to judges and prosecutors to ensure that they assess individual circumstances in collaboration cases, including evidence of coercion, intimidation, or threats of violence.

• Ensure that the penalties for violations of collaboration laws are proportionate to the gravity of the offense and consider alternatives to criminalization.

• Ensure that policies and laws on collaboration, filtration processes, and administrative penalties such as termination of employment and professional bans have a proper legal basis and are implemented consistently with Ukraine’s human rights obligations, including due process and fair trials, and relevant norms on occupation under international humanitarian law.

• To help ensure that prosecutions for collaboration activities focus only on serious cases for which there is evidence of actual harm caused to national security, devise a unified strategy that identifies and prioritizes such cases.

• Consider including changes to the anti-collaboration legislation as part of the government’s action plan for fulfilment of recommendations from the European Commission for Ukraine’s EU accession.

• Ensure all anti-collaboration verdicts and legal proceedings are matters of public record and proceedings are open to the public, in line with fair trial norms.

• Take action to end and prevent, including through monitoring and responding to complaints, any and all extralegal punishments, discrimination or harassment, official or otherwise, on individuals who are not charged with collaboration, but are nonetheless treated as suspects because they lived and worked under occupation.

• Likewise, make clear in public statements and other public interactions that the mere act of remaining in one’s home territory under Russian occupation is not a crime, nor in any way unpatriotic or cause for stigma.

To the European Union:

• As part of Ukraine’s EU accession and the analytical examination of applicable EU law (so-called screening of the EU “acquis”), discuss and review the collaboration law and its implementation, for example through trials in absentia, and include reform of this legislation among the priorities (“benchmarks”) for the first cluster of legal reforms in the accession process (the “fundamentals” cluster), including reforms in the judiciary and fundamental rights.

• As part of EU support to Ukraine in fulfilling its fundamental rights obligations for EU accession, work with the Ukrainian government to help them align with EU and international humanitarian and human rights law norms by developing guidelines on the implementation of collaboration legislation, including a strong focus on eliminating arbitrary application of the law and ensuring due process and the right to a fair trial.

• Assess the reform of the legislation and its implementation in the annual enlargement report on Ukraine.

To the Council of Europe, the OSCE, and other international organizations and actors:

• Collect and share evidence on the harms caused by the collaboration law and its potential negative impact on the successful reintegration of de-occupied territories, including the negative impact bad laws have on building robust respect for rule of law, post-conflict.

• Encourage Ukraine to seek an opinion by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission on the collaboration laws, their implementation, and to follow the recommendations made by the Commission.

Methodology

This report presents findings from research carried out by Human Rights Watch between March 2023 and September 2024. Human Rights Watch conducted 34 in-depth interviews with Ukrainian legal professionals, including active judges, defense lawyers and legal experts, as well as representatives from international organizations. Among the interviewees were also Ukrainian civil society representatives, human rights activists, and Ukrainian civilians with direct experience of living under occupation.

Research methodology also included a comprehensive analysis of current and draft legislation, as well as secondary sources. These sources comprised parliamentary commissions’ reviews of draft legislation and other official documents, court decisions from the Unified State Register of Court Decisions, publications by civil society groups, reports by the United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU), the OSCE’s Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE ODIHR) and the European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine (EUAM), along with academic research and media coverage.

All interviews were conducted in-person or remotely, in Ukrainian, English, or Russian and with informed consent. Most interviewees spoke on the condition that their names and other identifying information be withheld. Human Rights Watch did not provide interviewees with financial compensation or other incentives for participating.

Legislative Framework

On March 3, 2022, the Ukrainian parliament adopted two laws that criminalize collaboration and establish penalties for it. Law No. 2108-IX amended the Criminal Code of Ukraine by adding a new article 111-1, consisting of seven paragraphs that define “acts of collaboration,” and set out a range of penalties for them.[1] Law No. 2107-IX modified a range of Ukrainian laws—including those regulating elections, military service, state secrets, political parties, public associations, trade unions, freedom of conscience and religion, and citizens’ participation in protecting public order and the state border—to bring them into line with the amended criminal code.

In April 2022, the parliament adopted Law No. 2198-IX, which introduced article 111-2 to the criminal code, establishing criminal liability for aiding and abetting “an aggressor state.”[2] 

While article 111-1 applies only to Ukrainian citizens, article 111-2 applies both to Ukrainian citizens and foreigners.

Law No. 2110-IX, also adopted on March 3, 2022, further amended the criminal code, adding article 436-2, which banned “justification, recognition as legitimate, denial of armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine,” including by presenting Russia’s aggression against Ukraine as an internal civil conflict.[3]

Article 111-1 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine defines acts of collaboration as “public denial of the armed aggression against Ukraine” and “public calls for support for decisions and/or actions of the aggressor state,” “propaganda in educational institutions to facilitate the armed aggression against Ukraine and actions aimed at implementing the education standards of the aggressor state,” “transfer of material resources to the aggressor state,” “implementation of economic activities in cooperation with the aggressor state,” and “organization and conduct of political events, information activities in cooperation with the aggressor state.”

The legislation penalizes carrying out, under occupation, a wide range of public sector jobs. They encompass the misdemeanor of “voluntary occupation of a position not related to the performance of organizational-administrative or administrative-economic functions” (article 111-1, part 2) and the more serious felony offense of “voluntary occupation of a position related to the performance of organizational-administrative or administrative-economic functions” (article 111-1, part 5). Thus, the law distinguishes between situations in which Ukrainian citizens hold a position not related to performing administrative activities, punishable by deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities (with or without confiscation of property), and situations in which they hold administrative positions (punishable by deprivation of liberty).

Penalties are severe and range from a fine to a 3- to 5-year prison term. The period for deprivation of the right to hold certain positions or engage in certain activities is 10 to 15 years. Life imprisonment is stipulated for an aggravating circumstance involving the death of a person or other serious consequence resulting from actions defined in parts 5, 6, and 7 of article 111-1.

These definitions of collaboration are overly broad and vague, and baselessly criminalize a wide range of activities necessary for the maintenance of routine civilian services in occupied areas. They do not distinguish between Ukrainian civilians who hold public service positions under the occupation and may be required to cooperate to ensure civilian life can continue, and actual acts of collaboration intended to undermine state security and/or inflict real harm to security. And as described below, in cases Human Rights Watch analyzed, courts do not adequately assess actual harm, or the intent of the people charged with collaboration offenses.

Framework of International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law

International Humanitarian Law and Collaboration

The laws of war do not directly address wartime collaboration, but rather the fourth Geneva Convention codifies norms to protect civilians—as protected persons—under occupation from misconduct by occupying forces. These norms were applicable while Ukrainian civilians were living under Russian occupation in areas now liberated by Ukraine and continue to be applicable in areas still under Russian occupation, including Crimea.

While the fourth Geneva Convention does not address how the sovereign authorities of the occupied territory should treat civilians who have lived under occupation, it does set out the legal framework under which adult civilians may be expected to work under the occupation (article 51), and in particular in areas such as health care (article 56), education and child care (article 50) calls for “the cooperation of the national and local authorities” to maintain services essential to civilians.[4] Indeed the fourth Geneva Convention, while prohibiting the use of mental or physical coercion against civilians (article 31) or requiring civilians to serve in an occupying force or perform military or semi-military functions (article 51), does provide that civilians may be compelled to work “for the needs of the army of occupation” (article 51).[5]

It follows that civilians who perform work or cooperate with occupying forces in the circumstances provided for in Geneva Convention IV should not also be punished for it, by their own government.

Due Process and Fair Trial

Ukraine is a party to both the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which remain applicable during wartime.[6] Ukraine has exercised its right to derogate from certain obligations under the treaties in this time of war, but not with respect to the right to a fair trial, protected by article 6 of the ECHR and article 14 of the ICCPR.[7] Wartime does not relieve states of the obligation to conduct only fair trials, affording all essential judicial guarantees.[8]

The right to due process and a fair trial relating to criminal offences covers both obligations of substance and process. To preclude arbitrary application, a law that creates a “criminal charge,” on which basis a person can be deprived of their liberty, prosecuted, and punished, must comply with the principle of “legal certainty,” which requires that in substance it must be sufficiently accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application. Prosecution for offences that do not meet the “quality of law” test are arbitrary and inherently violate fair trial protections.

The right to a fair trial also guarantees due process rights, including the presumption of innocence, the right to effective representation, and the right to sufficient time and facilities to prepare a defense. Trials in absentia are fundamentally at odds with the right to a fair trial, which includes the right to be present at trial, and are only permitted in exceptional circumstances with safeguards.

How these standards play out in the application of Ukraine’s anti-collaboration laws is explored further in this report.

Anti-Collaboration Prosecution Data

Between the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022 and November 2024, Ukrainian authorities registered 147,559 war crimes, including 19,758 crimes against national security, according to the Office of the Prosecutor General.[9]

At time of writing, authorities had reportedly opened 8,894 criminal cases under article 111-1 of the Criminal Code (acts of collaboration) and 1,388 proceedings under article 111-2 (abetting an aggressor state).[10]

The full scope of the sentencing data for collaboration is unclear due to several factors. These include security-related restrictions on public access to parts of the national court register and duplications and gaps in the register itself. It appears, though, that the number of prosecutions for collaboration increased between 2023 and the first half of 2024 and declined between from June through August 2024.[11]

As of September 2024, Human Rights Watch had tabulated 1,948 verdicts under article 111-1 of the criminal code and 84 verdicts under article 111-2, using the state register of court decisions.[12] The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights of the Organization for Security and Co-Operation in Europe (ODIHR) reported that, as of May 2024, first-instance courts had issued a total of 1,622 decisions on collaboration cases, and that 634 of these rulings, or 39 percent, were issued between December 2023 and May 2024 alone, suggesting an increase in prosecution over time.[13] This indication that prosecutions are becoming more common is consistent with data reported by HRMMU for the period of March to May 2024. Its report stated that in the reporting period authorities opened 652 new cases of “collaboration activities” and Ukrainian courts issued verdicts in 322 cases, finding the defendants guilty in all cases.[14] The Human Rights Centre ZMINA, an independent Ukrainian group that has been closely monitoring collaboration verdicts, told Human Rights Watch that the number of verdicts that first instance courts delivered for acts of collaboration had at least doubled between September 2023 and April 2024.[15]

Deciphering the trend of recent prosecutions and convictions has become increasingly fraught, however, due to growing security related restrictions on public access to information. In May 2024, the Ukrainian parliament took a step further in restricting such access by adopting, at first reading, a bill that, if adopted into law, would restrict access to court decisions in cases of “special public interest,” including cases involving national security, protection of state secrets, border security, conscription, mobilization, and military service procedures. The bill stipulates that access would be restricted for the duration of martial law and one year thereafter.[16]

If passed, the bill will sharply curtail public awareness and debate concerning the impact of the anti-collaboration laws, depriving Ukrainian society of information necessary to assess them. The initiative triggered criticism from civil society groups. More than 30 Ukrainian rights groups called on the parliament to reject the legislation, arguing it imposed disproportionate restrictions on access to information, increased opportunities for corruption, and gave judges wide discretion to remove essential information on specific cases from court judgments.[17]

Concerns over Rushed and Flawed Legislation

Ukrainian civil society groups, government officials, and international organizations have criticized the anti-collaboration legislation for being overly broad and vague as well as for having been adopted in a rushed manner without proper consultation and debate.

Government officials have issued conflicting statements about what they believe constitutes collaboration with the occupying power. Some recognize the element of coercion as a mitigating factor. Others have appeared to attempt to shift responsibility to all residents living in occupied territories for not leaving their homes after the area came under occupation.

For example, Iryna Vereshchyk, the then-minister for reintegration of occupied territories, said in January 2024 that Russian authorities’ forces had forced Ukrainians living in occupied territories to collaborate, making it “impossible for them to return to Ukraine’s jurisdiction without being subjected to checks and investigations” and called on people to leave these territories.[18] Dmytro Lubinets, the Ukrainian parliament’s commissioner for human rights, stated that Ukraine will not prosecute those who receive social benefits or apply for a Russian passport, but suggested that anyone working for the occupying authorities should be prosecuted for collaboration.[19] The chair of the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Law Enforcement Issues said: “We understand that some people living in occupied areas are forced, for humanitarian reasons, to cooperate with occupiers one way or another. That’s why we want to modify [to soften] the criminal code articles that currently establish criminal responsibility for such actions.”[20]

Some legal professionals and human rights advocates believe that collaboration prosecutions should be integrated within a comprehensive transitional justice framework that balances the state’s legitimate security interests and the needs of civilians, including fostering truth-seeking, reconciliation, and the successful future reintegration of occupied territories.

For instance, a legal expert who worked on the development of a government strategy for prosecuting crimes of collaboration in Crimea said:

On one hand, authorities are not providing clear signals to people [residing in occupied areas] about what constitutes a crime and what doesn't, and what will happen to them when [Ukraine] returns and how they will be treated. People who have already suffered from the occupation are labeled as traitors or “collaborators.” On the other hand, this is a problem for Ukraine because these decisions will have to be made eventually [after occupied territories are liberated], and if they are made hastily, they will not be of good quality.” [21]

A human rights advocacy expert from ZMINA described to Human Rights Watch how in the weeks and months after the legislation was adopted, the group received “thousands of calls from people asking us whether their actions were going to fall under this legislation.”[22] Human Rights Watch also came across reports of parents who were worried that they might be accused of collaboration for having sent their children to camps in Russia to protect them from the war.[23]

Numerous draft laws suggesting amendments to the criminal code concerning collaboration have been proposed.[24] Some aim to sharpen current language and address inconsistencies between the articles, others seek to impose even stricter punishments for collaboration. At time of writing, none had advanced in parliament.

Legal Ambiguity

As noted above, key aspects of the criminal code’s definition of acts of collaboration are not in line with international human rights law and the law’s overly broad terminology has led to inconsistent, arbitrary prosecutions and excessive punishments.

Offences under article 111 of the criminal code (high treason), article 111-1 (collaboration), article 111-2 (aiding and abetting the aggressor state), and article 436-2 (justifying, recognizing as legitimate, or denying Russian Federation armed aggression against Ukraine, or glorifying its participants) do not clearly differ from one another. Due to the very broad wording, similar offenses can be classified under different criminal code articles, several legal practitioners told Human Rights Watch.[25] For instance, “speaking out in public in favor of the aggressor” can be classified under either article 111-1 or article 436-2 of the criminal code.

Furthermore, laws that address interactions with occupying forces do not clarify what might constitute “exchange of material resources” or what can be considered engaging in “economic activity” with them, or clearly define what performing “organizational-administrative or administrative-economic functions” means. The lack of clear definitions has also led to inconsistencies in how the law is applied.

In some instances, courts have issued identical verdicts for very different acts and seemingly very different levels of culpability under a given criminal code article. And vice versa: courts have viewed almost identical actions by defendants under similar circumstances differently depending on the prosecutor's interpretation or the judge's discretion, resulting in varying penalties.

For example, Human Rights Watch reviewed two guilty verdicts issued in the spring of 2024 against defendants charged under article 111-1, part 2 (working in a non-administrative job).

In the first case, a Ukrainian woman from Kharkivska region was accused of collaboration with the occupying authorities because she worked at the local library while her town was under occupation.[26] In her role as “acting head of library,” according to the case materials, she filled out library cards and assisted the library room’s visitors with searching for books and magazines. The woman pleaded guilty and was sentenced to a 10-year ban on holding any public sector position. The court considered her guilty plea a mitigating circumstance.

In the other case, a woman received the same sentence, also under article 111-1, part 2, but for holding a position of a head of village administration.[27] In that role, she had encouraged local residents to obtain Russian passports and send their children to a children's camp in Russia, as well as “supported and promoted the ideology of the ‘Russian world,’” according to the case materials. Although the court decision referenced a clear ideological motive to oppose Ukrainian security and interests, the verdict was identical to that of the librarian, who merely maintained the library's daily operations, such as issuing library cards.

Three guilty verdicts Human Rights Watch reviewed against individuals charged with “transferring material resources” or “participating in economic activity” (article 111-1, part 4) also illustrate these disparities. In the first, handed down in August 2023, a man agreed to be a security guard for a local market and pharmacy in exchange for food and other basic necessities.[28] He did not receive any other remuneration. A court sentenced him to a four-year prison term with confiscation of property and a 10-year ban on working in public service.

In the second, handed down in December 2023, an entrepreneur and head of a private agricultural business was charged for instructing his employees to plant crops and sell them in Russia.[29] He was also accused of organizing exports of sunflower seeds to Russia, for which the occupying authorities paid him in rubles. Finally, he was also accused of registering his enterprise with the Russian occupation tax authorities and paying taxes into the Russian budget. Unlike the guard, sentenced to four years in prison and confiscation of property for working in exchange for food to support his family, the entrepreneur was sentenced to a fine, confiscation of property, and a ban on public service, but not to a prison term.[30]

In the third verdict, issued in December 2022, a court found a boiler room technician guilty of “transferring material resources” to Russian forces. The technician, who had to cross a Russian checkpoint to get to work every morning, arranged to give Russian soldiers water and cigarettes in exchange for them letting him cross the checkpoint daily. He was sentenced to a fine of 9,860 hryvnas (US$ 240) and a 10-year ban on public service positions.[31]

Prosecuting Medical and Education Workers for Collaboration

Occupying forces can compel adult civilians living under occupation to do work for “the public utility services, or for the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transportation, or health of the population of the occupied country,”[32] although they are prohibited from exercising mental or physical coercion against civilians.[33] In addition to this general provision addressing the need to ensure that basic services continue to function for the benefit of the civilian population, there are specific provisions in Geneva Convention IV that address the role of medical personnel and educators working under occupation.

Medical Personnel

Doctors and medical personnel are afforded special protection under international humanitarian law and are obligated to provide care to all those in need. In times of occupation, Geneva Convention IV provides that an occupying power “has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territory” (emphasis added).[34] It explicitly provides that “medical personnel of all categories shall be allowed to carry out their duties.”[35] Therefore using collaboration charges to target any medical workers who have continued to work during occupation to ensure the functioning of the public health system directly contravenes international humanitarian law and undermines protections afforded to civilians under occupation.

Human Rights Watch identified five verdicts against medical workers accused of collaboration since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion. While they were not prosecuted solely for treating patients under occupation, these doctors and other medical personnel were found guilty of collaboration under part 5 of article 111-1 (carrying out work in jobs with administrative functions). For example, in January 2023, a court sentenced a doctor from Melitopol to six years in prison with confiscation of property for assuming the role of medical director at one of the city’s hospitals.[36] The verdict was handed down in absentia, a violation of fair trial guarantees.

As noted above, the issue of how the law should treat people who cooperate with occupying authorities is extremely contentious in Ukrainian society. This is particularly evident, for example, in the ongoing debate about medical workers performing administrative duties under occupation. For example, a consultant with a nongovernmental group that is advising Ukraine’s Ministry of Health and Ministry of Reintegration on a plan for reintegrating health care institutions in de-occupied territories, said: “To me, the line should be: if a person voluntarily agreed to perform administrative and economic activities which led to certain legal consequences, such as hiring and coordinating medical staff, signing orders connected with the functioning of the institution and so on, then it’s definitely collaboration.”[37]

The actions the expert described are in fact necessary for the continuing functioning of medical institutions, including for the benefit of the civilian population (as provided for in Geneva Convention IV) and should never be treated as collaboration. As a practicing defense attorney and a human rights lawyer from a prominent human rights group correctly pointed out:

Doctors and medical workers are protected [under international law] to do their job. But for some reason, some [people] in Ukraine think that heads of hospitals or others [medical workers] who perform administrative functions should be penalized. In my view, we should look at medics as a “protected category” not only when they provide urgent medical care in the field, but also when they need to provide treatment in a hospital, with functional equipment and other necessary facilities, which means that someone must create conditions for them to do so. To me, these processes are connected.[38]

Education Professionals

The fourth Geneva Convention also requires an occupying power “with the cooperation of the national and local authorities, to facilitate the proper working of all institutions devoted to the care and education of children” (emphasis added).[39]

Yet, as of March 2024, the HRMMU had identified 35 criminal verdicts, against 30 women and 5 men, who were employees of educational facilities (school headmasters or their deputies, university administration employees) and employees of “educational departments” in occupied territory.[40] Between March and May 2024 alone, OHCHR found, courts issued another 21 guilty verdicts for holding such positions.[41] All 76 were found guilty of “the implementation of education standards of the Russian Federation” or “propaganda in educational facilities.” In almost half of these cases, the defendants were convicted in absentia. In most cases, individuals received penalties ranging from 1 to 10 years of imprisonment, while all were banned from holding certain positions.

A letter the Ministry of Education and Science sent to heads of educational institutions and district and regional administrations in September 2022, which Human Rights Watch later obtained, clarified the range of education professionals in occupied areas who risked criminal prosecution for collaboration. The letter warned educational workers that “treason and cooperation with the occupiers are criminal offenses and result in severe punishment.”[42] The letter emphasized that working in any managerial, teaching or research position under the occupying authorities is “categorically unacceptable.” While “the scale and consequences of such behavior” will be considered by a court of law when determining the severity of punishment in individual cases, the letter states, “the blatant nature of the crime is beyond doubt” with regard to these actions. 

The letter specified elements of collaboration, including “participation in the educational process under the occupying power” and “implementation of the education standards of the aggressor state.” It stated that allegations of such actions must be confirmed by factual evidence, documented by an official investigation. The letter referred to Methodological Guidelines by the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption regarding identifying collaboration. However, the guidelines, which Human Rights Watch reviewed, approach collaboration as a broad offense, without establishing specific thresholds that would have to be met for an action to be considered an offense.[43]

In March 2024, Human Rights Watch interviewed the family of a 43-year-old Ukrainian language teacher sentenced to prison for collaborating with the occupying authorities under criminal code article 111-1, part 3 (“implementing the education standards of the aggressor state”). [44] The teacher had agreed to become a director of one of her city’s lyceums in mid-August 2022. The teacher’s family told Human Rights Watch that the woman had no choice because she had to support her family, which included an older mother, an ill brother, and her 10-year-old son. She held the post for a little over a month and the school was closed during that time. When the city was de-occupied, in September 2022, Ukrainian authorities required the woman to undergo compulsory security screening, or “filtration,” which she passed. She was, however, subsequently fired from the role she took under occupation and not able to return to her previous job.

In February 2023, she was charged with collaboration and placed in pre-trial detention. 

In late December 2023, a court convicted and sentenced her to one year in prison. The family was expecting the woman’s release in March 2024, but the prosecutor’s office appealed the verdict, seeking a two-year sentence. In April, the appeals court sentenced her to an additional 6 months in jail.

The appeal decision, reviewed by Human Rights Watch, stated that the court of first instance did not fully take into account “the gravity of the criminal offense committed by the accused, in particular, the fact that …[the accused] committed a crime against the foundations of the national security of Ukraine, representing a greater public danger, carried out actions aimed at introducing educational standards of the aggressor state in educational institutions during the period martial law, caused extremely negative consequences for the introduction of a full-fledged educational process in Ukraine.”[45]

The human rights lawyer from Media Initiative for Human Rights questioned the legal basis and practicality of the categorical criminalization of working as an educator under occupation, stating:

There are legal issues and issues of state policy. Firstly, there are 30 to 40 thousand teachers in Crimea, so we would have to convict tens of thousands. Clearly the problem cannot be solved this way. The second approach is entirely legalistic. If we prosecute teachers, we are effectively saying: “Children in occupied areas should be illiterate. They should not be taught to read and write,” which is a fundamental right—a right to education. Although when education is closely tied with ideology, it’s a different story.”[46]

Similarly, a Ukrainian judge said that prosecuting teachers implied that Ukrainian educators in occupied areas should abandon their pupils to the Russian forces. He said:

We are punishing people for what would not have been a crime in ordinary circumstances. Simply because a person continued their normal activities, but under the Russian flag, it suddenly became a criminal offense. This should not be happening.

I believe that, on the contrary, if we look at the teachers who stayed—they stayed with their children. And what would have been better—for them [Russian occupying forces] to bring teachers from Rostov? From Buryatia? From Udmurtia? Russia is obliged to ensure the educational process in the occupied territories. Or even worse, they [Russian forces] could have taken the children to Russia for education. Would that have made the children better off? Or Ukraine? … It is a very difficult choice—to stay with the children or to flee and leave the children at the mercy of the victor.[47]

Given the context of occupation and the responsibilities of teachers and education administrators to the education of children, Ukrainian authorities should not penalize individuals in occupied territories for providing education to children under the Russian curriculum. Human Rights Watch notes that some of the subjects under the Russian curriculum, such as math and sciences, have no ideological component.

Furthermore, the objective alternatives to Ukrainian educators teaching Ukrainian children are for those children to be either denied education, for their families to be displaced out of the occupied regions, or for Russian occupying forces, in furtherance of their obligation to maintain educational functions in areas they occupy, to import Russian educators.  

Public Harm and Guilty Intent

Ukrainian law, as set out in the Criminal Code, requires both a criminal intent—known as mens rea or guilty mind—and harm to be done, before someone can be held liable for a criminal offense. Article 11 of the Criminal Code, which establishes the general principles of criminal liability, defines a crime as “a socially dangerous, guilty (willful or careless) act (omission)” of a sane person of mandatory criminal age. The article emphasizes both the act causing harm and the state of mind (intent) of the perpetrator. While the term “mens rea” is not explicitly used throughout the code, criminal intent is implied within the definitions of individual crimes. 

The same principles of legality also inform what may be considered legitimate offences under international law.

Ukrainian legal experts and human rights lawyers interviewed by Human Rights Watch for this report held different views on how the anti-collaboration law should be interpreted or applied. However, they all agreed that the law’s flaws created a significant risk of arbitrary prosecutions for activities that were either lawful to begin with and/or for which the accused had no criminal intent and posed no public danger or harm.

For example, a human rights lawyer with experience defending collaboration cases in Ukrainian courts said: “In my view, there is a contradiction in that essential services provided to the population in occupied areas cannot at the same time be recognized by law as carrying public harm.”[48]

A defense attorney, who was preparing to appeal a collaboration verdict in court, said: “[To improve collaboration legislation] we need to be very clear on when such actions were motivated, for example, by intent to harm, [or] to profit. There are those who should be punished [for collaboration]. But there are many who were just trying to help people and they shouldn’t suffer.”[49]

Human Rights Watch reviewed three case files involving individuals charged and sentenced to prison terms under part 5 of article 111-1 for working in positions involving administrative functions under the occupying authorities. All three cases lacked any indication that the accused had any criminal intent or that harm resulted from their actions, to others or to society.

The first of the three verdicts was issued in January 2024 by a court in Dniepropetrovska region against a veterinarian from the occupied Luhanska region.[50] According to the verdict, the veterinarian had collaborated with the occupying authorities by agreeing to be appointed deputy head of veterinary medicine at the municipal veterinary clinic. She was tried in absentia and sentenced to 10 years in prison with confiscation of property and a 12-year ban on engaging in certain activities.

The second concerned a 53-year-old railway station cleaner from the city of Lyman in Donetska region, which remained under Russian occupation for five months between the end of May and the beginning of October 2022.[51] Before Russia’s full-scale invasion, she was a grassroots community leader who represented residents in their interactions with local authorities. After Russian forces occupied the city in May 2022, she replaced the head of her micro district, who fled immediately after the occupation. In her role, she engaged with the occupying authorities on behalf of residents and helped them receive humanitarian aid, food, and coal. Ukrainian armed forces de-occupied the city in September 2022, and Ukraine’s security services detained her in January 2023. Notwithstanding that her role was to help with “the feeding, sheltering, clothing, transportation or health” of the population, as foreseen by the Geneva Conventions, in August 2023, a court in Dnipro convicted her under article 111-1, part 5 (holding an administrative position) and sentenced her to five years in prison for carrying out this role. [52]

The woman’s lawyer, who appealed the verdict, told Human Rights Watch that she was not counting on an acquittal but was hoping for a more lenient sentence for her client.[53] In May 2024, the appellate court upheld the guilty verdict.

The lawyer said:

[In my practice,] I came across cases of real collaborators, for example, people who pointed out to occupiers the flats that were abandoned by locals when they fled the war, and others who wanted to cause harm or profit. I personally believe there are real collaborators that should be punished. But [my client], what is she being punished [and jailed] for? She did nothing but help people. She had a bicycle, unlike others, so she could get around and help [distribute aid].

A high-level public official from Lyman, who, according to media, left Lyman the day before the occupation and returned after the city was de-occupied, considered the woman to be guilty even before the trial was finished. In a media interview, he said: “I don’t know how they worked. But if there are court trials, they broke Ukrainian law. They betrayed their motherland, where they were born and where they studied and earned a pension.”[54]

The third case involves an electrician, also from Lyman, convicted for becoming the head of the municipal electricity service provider under the so-called “DNR” administration. In that capacity, he led the efforts to restore the city’s electrical supply, damaged by hostilities. During trial, the electrician partially admitted his guilt and asked the court to take into account mitigating circumstances: that electricity in the city needed to be urgently restored before winter and that he acted out of urgent need to support his family, which included a newborn child and older relatives with medical conditions.[55] The court sentenced him to three years in prison with confiscation of property, a professional ban of 10 years as well as a 10-year ban on participating in work involving the upkeep and management of electrical grids. The appeals court overturned the verdict citing procedural violations but did not clear the man of collaboration charges.[56] In the revised sentence, the 10-year professional ban was removed, and the man was released on probation. Although the appellate court issued a more lenient sentence, it did not exonerate him or expunge his criminal record.

Disregard of Coercion and Duress

The anti-collaboration laws do not adequately address situations where Ukrainian civilians in areas under Russian occupation cooperate with the occupying forces under duress or coercion. As described above, the law is being interpreted to criminalize certain acts without regard to the motivation of the defendants. The criminal code includes the word “voluntary” in its definition of acts of collaboration, but the courts hew to a narrow definition of coercion[57] and ignore the factual circumstances of duress and coercion during occupation.[58] The combination of these factors can lead to unjust prosecutions.

Legal definitions aside, the problem, as a Ukrainian judge put it, is also in the unrealistic and unjust expectation that "loyal" Ukrainian citizens will withstand torture and ill-treatment, and that such resolute patriotism might be manufactured through fear of criminal prosecution following de-occupation:

This legislation normalizes heroism. And heroism is not the norm. And the current approach—if you’re not a hero, you’re a criminal—is not at all right or helpful for the future of Ukraine.[59]  

Numerous reports by Ukrainian and international human rights organizations (including Human Rights Watch) and intergovernmental organizations have documented the physical violence, threats, abduction and torture of family members, and other grave abuses Russian occupation forces have perpetrated against Ukrainian civilians to compel them to submit to Russian rule.[60] They have also documented widespread accounts of severe trauma and stress among Ukrainian civilians who lived under occupation. Many reported losing their livelihoods and being forced to work just to survive and sustain themselves and their families.

Four residents of cities in an eastern Ukraine region, which remained under occupation for several months in 2022, described to Human Rights Watch what life looked like under the Russian occupation. One said:

People had nothing to eat. There were food packages once a month—for four people—they included 100 grams of sugar, 200 grams of flour. People had to work—not because they were taking sides, but just to [survive.] Local [Ukrainian] authorities left almost immediately, they blew up bridges.… There was no food, shops and storages were cleaned out. There were more people in the city than supplies needed to survive.[61]

Regardless of the specific circumstances an individual might face when deciding whether to work for the occupation administration, it cannot be ignored that a foreign military occupation imposes a certain degree of coercive stress on residents of occupied areas, hardship exacerbated greatly in this case by official Russian policies regarding occupied areas and by widespread abuses against civilians by Russian forces.

When asked about the coercion of Ukrainian civilians by Russian forces, the legal consultant to the Ukraine’s Ministry of Health and Ministry of Reintegration dismissed this broader context and cited instances where individuals faced threats of death or torture yet maintained their loyalty to Ukraine by refusing to cooperate. He then acknowledged that each case should be considered individually.

But other experts told Human Rights Watch that too often Ukrainian courts overlook or dismiss duress as a factor when determining guilt and sentencing in collaboration cases.

For instance, in the case of the security guard described above, the defendant stated in court that Russian military forced him to accept the job of guarding a local market and a pharmacy by threatening him and his family. Nonetheless, the court did not consider this as “sufficient” duress and determined his work under Russian occupation was “voluntary.” As with several other verdicts reviewed by Human Rights Watch, the court based its verdict on the absence of “objective data indicating that measures of physical and/or mental coercion were applied.”[62]

Human Rights Watch also reviewed cases where the defendants claimed in court that they were subjected to torture, but the court disregarded that information, citing lack of proof. For example, a man in Kharkivska region, the head of the workshop for the manufacturing of lighting products, was accused of delivering three vehicles from the premises of the workshop to the Russian forces.[63] In court, he said that Russian soldiers stopped him on the street on the way to his parents’ house and brought him to their headquarters, where they held him for a day, beat him, tied his arms behind his back while holding a grenade, and threatened to kill his girlfriend and his parents. His court testimony was supported by his partner and another family member. The court ruled that insufficient evidence was presented to show that he was under physical or psychological pressure. He was sentenced to five years in prison, with confiscation of property and a ten-year ban on involvement in commercial activities.

While Human Rights Watch cannot assess the accuracy of coercion claims in the individual cases cited above, coercion of Ukrainian civilians by invading Russian forces has been amply documented. Although claims of coercion have been raised as a defense in multiple cases, at time of writing, Human Rights Watch has identified only one acquittal that was issued on the grounds of coercion in verdicts handed down in collaboration prosecutions between May 2022 and August 2024.[64]

Compromised Right to Defense and Other Due Process Concerns

The high conviction rate, the prevalence of plea bargains, the low rate of appeals, and the scarcity of lawyers willing to handle collaboration cases raise concern about potential due process and fair trial violations for individuals accused of collaboration.

Wartime does not relieve states of the obligation to conduct only fair trials, affording all essential judicial guarantees.[65] Ukraine’s official derogation from its human rights treaties’ obligations under martial law due to the war, does not include derogations from fair trial guarantees under either the European Convention on Human Rights or the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

Conviction Bias and Few Appeals

As noted above, as of September 2024 Human Rights Watch had tabulated 1,948 verdicts under article 111-1 of the criminal code and 84 verdicts under article 111-2.[66] Analysis of the verdicts shows a conviction rate of more than 99 percent.

Of these verdicts, as of September 2024, Human Rights Watch found only seven acquittals: six under article 111-1 and one under article 111-2, which was subsequently overturned after the prosecution appealed the verdict. No acquittals were granted as the result of appeals. 

In many collaboration cases, courts ordered pre-trial detention without considering individual circumstances or the strength of evidence.[67] International human rights law provides that pre-trial detention should be used only as an exceptional measure.[68]

Human Rights Watch’s analysis of verdicts in collaboration cases also suggests that most collaboration cases never make it to appeal and that appellate courts grant very few defense appeals in such cases.

Of the 1,948 verdicts we tabulated under article 111-1, we identified 104 appeals that led to revised sentences, the vast majority leading to harsher, rather than more lenient, sentences. (We identified only one appeal under article 111-2.)

Of the 104 appeals under article 111-1, 38 were filed by prosecutors, 56 by the defense, and 10 jointly. Appellate courts granted all appeals filed by prosecutors, resulting in harsher penalties. Of the appeals to revise the sentence filed by the defense, courts granted only five (three partially and two in full), and the rest were denied. Courts also granted two prosecution appeals to reduce sentences and one joint appeal to reduce a sentence. In the five defense appeals that were granted, the appellate courts mostly cited procedural violations rather challenged the substance of charges or addressed the individual circumstances of the defendant.

Appealing a decision on a collaboration case can be time-consuming and costly, as it requires legal defense services that many cannot afford, in an environment where there are too few lawyers willing to take on collaboration cases. This can deter people from appealing even if they have a strong case, experts interviewed for this report said.[69]

A significant number of verdicts in collaboration cases are based on plea bargains, which sharply reduces the eligibility of the accused to appeal verdicts in the Ukrainian legal system.[70]

Reflecting on the low numbers of appeals in collaboration cases, one practicing Ukrainian lawyer said:

When the defendant is not present, no one appeals the verdict. When the defendant is present, too many people enter plea deals with the prosecution. So it goes [like this]: the charges are all brought, the court approves them, and no one challenges them. This indicates that people either lack the strength or the desire to contest the charges. I don't know if they are being intimidated, if it's a matter of poor legal representation, or if they just want to get it over with.

This entire situation prevents these cases from being reviewed by higher courts, and no unified judicial practice is established. Decisions are made locally, and they are not even systematically analyzed or reviewed.”[71]

Plea Bargains

Plea bargains are a feature of criminal justice systems that allow an accused to obtain a lesser charge or receive a reduced sentence in exchange for a guilty plea in advance of trial. They are not necessarily incompatible with fair trials rights, but, as the European Court of Human Rights has pointed out, in substance this amounts to a waiver of a number of procedural rights, and to be effective “any waiver of procedural rights must always be established in an unequivocal manner, must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate with its importance and must not run counter to any important public interest.”[72]

The Criminal Procedure Code of Ukraine affords defendants who enter a plea agreement significantly fewer grounds for appeal and a shorter timeframe to file an appeal compared to defendants in ordinary cases.[73]

Although the number of plea bargains in collaboration cases has reportedly decreased, possibly linked to the increase of in absentia proceedings, plea bargaining in collaboration cases remains pervasive.[74]

Lawyers and judges interviewed by Human Rights Watch questioned whether a system that heavily relies on plea bargains can effectively determine guilt or innocence and impose appropriate sentences. Some argued that inconsistencies in the anti-collaboration law and the bias towards conviction might push defendants into pleading guilty to lesser charges, even when innocent, to avoid potentially harsher penalties.

One Ukrainian legal expert said, for instance: “Has the person admitted their guilt to avoid further complications and a harsher sentence, or has it been done to find a compromise and a solution? That line gets blurred. Were the charges correct and proportionate or did the person agree because they don’t trust the system or can’t find a lawyer who would agree [to take on such a case]?”[75]

Inadequate Legal Defense

Lawyers, judges, and others told Human Rights Watch there are not enough lawyers willing to take on collaboration cases. Several people noted reports of threats, intimidation, and public condemnation of lawyers working on such cases.[76] One lawyer said the law was so poorly written that effective defense was impossible.[77]

At a roundtable meeting on the practice of investigating crimes of collaboration organized by the Office of the Prosecutor General of Ukraine, a senior staff member of the Ukrainian Legal Aid Foundation noted the dearth of available lawyers and the apparently perfunctory nature of trials. He said: “We met with the practice when, in some frontline areas, there was one lawyer handling 50 to 60 cases. This is a violation of the rules of legal ethics. Moreover, the verdicts in [collaboration] cases are often simply rubber-stamped. In such cases, the participation of a lawyer is rather superficial.”[78] A Ukrainian human rights NGO expert said: “Lawyers often say that they feel pressure from law enforcement agencies through bar associations … for being too active in court [in collaboration cases].”[79]

Independent assessments conducted by Ukrainian and international groups have pointed to due process violations in court hearings on collaboration cases. One group noted that even when a defendant obtains formal defense representation, the counsel’s role in court can be muted. Safe Ukraine, in partnership with the International Renaissance Foundation, analyzed 25 verdicts under article 111-1 issued since the adoption of the collaboration legislation and through December 2023. All 25 were guilty verdicts, 14 were handed down with direct participation of the defendants and 11 were issued in absentia. 

The study, shared with Human Rights Watch, highlighted a lack of consistency in judicial practice concerning the involvement of defense counsel in collaboration cases.[80] In at least half of the analyzed verdicts with a defendant present, the defense counsel’s participation in the trial was “perfunctory and not significant for the process.” In some cases, for example, the defense lawyer’s role was limited to a formal indication of the presence of defense counsel during the trial. Six rulings contained no mention of defense counsel at all.

In Absentia Rulings

In absentia rulings are a prominent feature of Ukraine’s implementation of anti-collaboration laws, notwithstanding that in absentia trials have questionable legal status under international law. An estimated one-third of the 1,948 verdicts that Human Rights Watch examined under article 111-1 were issued in absentia.[81] Other organizations have also found high, and growing numbers of in absentia verdicts. For example, according to analysis by the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, out of 1,010 collaboration cases prosecuted between May 2022 and December 2023, 1007 resulted in guilty verdicts, 207 of which were handed down in absentia.[82] ZMINA reported a significant rise in in absentia proceedings between September 2023 and June 2024.[83]

International law does not strictly prohibit trials in absentia, but strongly disfavors them, permitting them only in exceptional circumstances and if there are specific safeguards in place.[84] To start, the person tried must have been properly and effectively summoned for trial, have chosen not to appear or clearly and unequivocally waived their right to be present, and measures must be taken during the proceedings before the court to ensure that defense rights are still effectively safeguarded in the accused’s absence.[85] Critically, anyone convicted in absentia has a right to a full and fair retrial, not just an appeal, should they subsequently find themselves in custody, or the trial is invalid. These standards are reflected in Ukraine’s fair trial obligations under both the European Convention on Human Rights (article 6) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (article 14), and have been reiterated by the Council of Europe in numerous resolutions.[86] The European Court of Human Rights has emphasized that the accused’s presence at trial “ranks as one of the essential requirements of Article 6” and that “a denial of justice … undoubtedly occurs where a person convicted in absentia is subsequently unable to obtain from the court a fresh determination of the merits of the charge, in respect of both law and fact.”[87] The Court confirmed that when it is not possible to reopen proceedings conducted in the accused’s absence, there will be a “flagrant denial of justice” rendering the proceedings “manifestly contrary to the provisions of Article 6 or the principles embodied therein.”[88]

The European Union’s Court of Justice has also held that, in compliance with the right to a remedy and fair trial under the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, a trial in absentia could only be considered acceptable if the accused can later “secure the reopening of the proceedings or access to an equivalent legal remedy resulting in a fresh examination, in his or her presence, of the merits of the case.”[89]  

There is little to indicate that the in absentia trials held in collaboration prosecutions would meet the standards of fair trial and there is no clear guarantee of a retrial for the accused in person. Out of 11 in absentia verdicts in a study reviewed by Human Rights Watch, one had only a formal mention of the defense counsel’s involvement and his role was limited to attesting that the defendant received proper notification of the court hearing. Four verdicts merely indicated the defense counsel's presence without describing their actions. In three cases, defense attorneys stated their position that the defendants’ guilt was not proven, but did not appeal the verdicts.
 

Chilling Effect of Anti-Collaboration Legislation on Reintegration Efforts and Transitional Justice

Acts of collaboration fall under offenses against national security and Ukraine is entitled to bring charges against and prosecute those who harmed national security during the occupation. However, it must do so in compliance with its international humanitarian law and human rights obligations, including those regarding a fair trial. In addition to concerns about inadequate safeguards for defendants’ rights in existing collaboration laws and their implementation, Ukrainian legal experts, judges, and civil society activists who spoke with Human Rights Watch emphasized the importance of balancing immediate security interests and accountability with broader goals they believe anti-collaboration laws should promote: the eventual reintegration of Russia-occupied territories, including Crimea, which has been under occupation for over 10 years.

Reintegration is one of the goals of transitional justice, a process aimed at addressing the aftermath of conflict or human rights abuse. Importantly, transitional justice can begin during a conflict, not just after it ends. It involves dealing with the past, such as bringing perpetrators to justice and providing support to victims, but also focuses on preventing future harm. This can include building strong institutions and establishing mechanisms to ensure accountability.[90]

Fueling Mistrust, Inhibiting Reintegration

In practice, the expansive nature of the anti-collaboration laws has many mutually reinforcing consequences that inhibit reintegration. For example, the vague and overly broad laws put many Ukrainian citizens living under Russian occupation at risk of prosecution and/or informal blacklisting after Ukraine regains control of its territory; they make community members feel they are justified in ostracizing their neighbors who interacted with the occupation administration; and they send a message that anyone who remains in occupied areas and does not overtly resist occupying authorities could be viewed as a collaborator. The laws signal to local authorities in de-occupied areas that they can, for example, fire anyone from their jobs who worked under the occupation administration, regardless of whether they were suspected of a collaboration offense and even if they had passed post-occupation security screenings. A stark division has thereby been drawn between Ukrainians who endured the Russian occupation and those who fled to Ukrainian-controlled territory, a division that is further fueled by the potential of using collaboration accusations as a tool to settle personal scores and to get ahead in competition over scarce resources and jobs.

When occupied territories are liberated, Ukrainian law enforcement authorities conduct "filtration," a process involving security screenings of local residents, the goal of which is to identify potential security threats, including genuine collaborators. This could be a legitimate process, if conducted in line with due process guarantees. However, irrespective of how the process itself is conducted, in practice, being cleared by “filtration” provides no guarantee to an individual that local authorities and neighbors alike will not retaliate against them and keep them under a cloud of suspicion. Human Rights Watch has documented cases where residents in de-occupied areas who, having undergone filtration, were cleared of any suspicion of involvement in collaboration, and yet local authorities harassed, publicly stigmatized, and deemed them ineligible for employment.  In some cases, local residents’ desire for justice and retribution led to the mistreatment of those they perceived as collaborators, even after they cleared filtration.

One example is the experience of 39-year-old Olha O., who resides in a city that was under Russian occupation for about a month in March 2022.[91] Olha told Human Rights Watch that Russian soldiers stationed on her street subjected her to repeated incidents of sexual violence. She said she “went along” with it on the condition that the soldiers would not touch her daughter, who was 13 at the time.[92] Following de-occupation, Olha said, she underwent “filtration”. She was repeatedly summoned for interrogation by Ukraine’s law enforcement agencies, including the SBU (the Security Service of Ukraine) and National Police. Officials questioned her without legal counsel on several occasions, subjected her to a polygraph test, and searched her house. They focused on her alleged connections to Russians, treating her with hostility and suspicion and accused her of being a collaborator. “They made me undergo a lie detector, searched my house...,” she said. “No one was interested at all in me telling them about the rape. They took our phones and treated us like dogs. Like I was a traitor.”[93]

Olha’s lawyer confirmed to Human Rights Watch that the authorities who conducted “filtration” interviews with Olha treated her with skepticism and hostility.[94] Olha was not recognized as a survivor of conflict-related sexual violence until late summer of 2022.

After the security screenings, Ukrainian authorities told Olha that she was no longer a suspect and informed her of her right to seek justice for the sexual violence she experienced. However, she described how the extensive and intrusive filtration process fueled suspicion and accusations of collaboration with Russian soldiers from her local community: “After we were liberated, neighbors started attacking us verbally, several times they broke windows in my house, where my mother also lives with us. I asked the police several times to help but they did nothing.”[95] 

Human Rights Watch interviewed residents of three cities that Russian forces had temporarily occupied that illustrate how local Ukrainian authorities stigmatized residents, including those who already passed filtration and simply had them fired from their public sector jobs.

A teacher of Ukrainian language and literature with 15 years’ teaching experience from a city in an eastern Ukraine region said that she had no choice but to remain in her city during Russian occupation.[96] She said she continued to work under the occupying authorities to access food and other necessities and support her husband, a military veteran, who was in hiding. During that time Russian authorities sent her to a short teacher training course in Russia. Because of that, after the city was de-occupied, she faced employment barriers, including being barred from her previous position and denied employment at other educational facilities. Even though she passed the “filtration process,” she said, she was told that she’ll never work as a teacher again.

She eventually got a manual job at a railway station.

During the interview with Human Rights Watch, she spoke at length about her ongoing psychological stress, anxiety, and fear, her loss of livelihood, and reprisals for actions she said she took under pressure: “All I want is to work with children. I can’t imagine my life without it. I started from kindergarten, then taught at school—this has been my whole life. And now because of one thing, that I did to save a loved one, my life has been destroyed. I did nothing wrong.”

A resident of another city said: “Kindergarten teachers, cleaners, librarians—all who used to receive money from the [municipal] budget—even if they didn’t step out of their homes, didn’t work, but just remained under occupation—[most were] immediately fired. When the authorities returned, the order [must have been] issued to fire them all.”[97]

Another individual also told Human Rights Watch that once their city was de-occupied and local authorities returned, they adopted a policy of firing anyone who continued to work under the occupation. This person was familiar with the case of the teacher whose criminal prosecution for agreeing to become a lyceum director is described above (“Prosecuting Medical and Education Workers for Collaboration.”) The person said the teacher had initially passed her filtration screening, but objected when she was subsequently fired, and authorities prosecuted her to discourage other people from challenging being fired. 

She said, “Why did they lock her [the teacher] up? Because it was a precedent and because she fought back, she argued that she shouldn’t have been fired. If she didn’t fight back, others who were fired might have started arguing why they were fired. But once she was in jail, no one dared to make a peep. No one argued.”

Seeking Balance Between Justice and Reintegration

Nearly three years after the shock of the Russia’s full-scale invasion and the rushed passage of the anti-collaboration laws, some Ukrainian legislators, as noted above, are rethinking their impact and proposing amendments. The European Union Advisory Mission in Ukraine (EUAM) also recommended that lawmakers consider the broader context of transitional justice. This includes adequately taking into consideration the views of the public and civil society groups on balancing punishment and amnesty for those who might be considered collaborators, as well as addressing society’s reconciliation goals. The EUAM analysis noted, in particular: “Criminalization of collaboration activities is only one possible tool of transitional justice. Balanced use of different tools is a prerequisite for the restoration of lasting peace and justice in the liberated territories.”[98]

Several Ukrainian legal experts interviewed by Human Rights Watch concur. With respect to people who provided regular services to civilians, these experts argue that the Ukrainian government should be encouraging them to stay in communities that come under occupation to provide these services, rather than make it clear they will later be punished if they stay.

A Supreme Court judge said that the high conviction rates in collaboration cases will only contribute to increased tensions within occupied territories:

I think [remaining in the community] should not be punished but encouraged. The same goes for doctors, for community workers. There is even a question about the police—if they continue to patrol the streets, protecting people from crime—well, I personally have a lot of doubt that they are collaborators.[99]

A legal expert, who specialized in analyzing collaboration legislation in Crimea, said:

From a purely legal prospective, there are so many ways this legislation can be improved, especially on public harm. There are so many issues that are unclear. And yet, when all these recommendations are voiced by Ukrainian lawyers, human rights defenders and so on, it doesn’t seem enough to break the tide and force the [parliamentarians] to make these changes.[100]

Among the purposes of deterring collaboration is to safeguard Ukraine's security interests and make Russia's occupation harder and more costly—all in the service of restoring Ukraine's territorial integrity. Many residents of de-occupied areas as well as Ukrainian lawyers, suggested that the anti-collaboration laws, and the way they are being implemented, can have the opposite effect.

A defense attorney said, “This law is so vague that it makes Russia’s job as occupiers easier, by making people under occupation live in fear that if Russia leaves, they will all be penalized.”[101] A legal analyst said: “What about people in Crimea? They’ve been living there for 10 years, there are children who grew up under Russia. People who have been working, paying taxes there—are they all collaborators? Should they all be punished?”[102] 

Residents of formerly occupied areas, as well as activists and human rights groups consistently reported that prosecutions of alleged collaborators have fostered fear, suspicion, and distrust in those communities. Many viewed prosecuting residents for collaboration as a severe obstacle to future reintegration efforts. As the judge said: “In addition to recently occupied territories, there are also long-occupied territories: Crimea, parts of the Luhanska and Donetska regions. If Ukraine's approach is ‘if you stayed—you are a collaborator,’ we are potentially creating a resistance front there. We will not be met as victors. We will not be welcomed.”[103]
 

Acknowledgements

This report was researched and written by a senior researcher in the Europe and Central Asia Division of Human Rights Watch.

Aisling Reidy, senior legal advisor at Human Rights Watch, wrote the chapter on international humanitarian and human rights law and provided legal review of the report. Kseniya Kvitka, assistant researcher in the Europe and Central Asia Division, provided reviews and contributed to the research. The report was edited by Rachel Denber, Europe and Central Asia Associate Director. Joseph Saunders, associate program director, provided programmatic review.

Specialist reviews were provided by Belkis Wille, Crisis and Conflict associate director, Iskra Kirova, Europe and Central Asia division advocacy director, Zama Neff, Children’s Rights Division director, and Balkees Jarrah, International Justice division associate director.

Elly Bleier, senior associate in the Europe and Central Asia division, and Travis Carr, publications officer, prepared the report for publication. José Martinez, administrative officer, coordinated production.

Tanya Totska translated the report from English to Ukrainian.

Human Rights Watch would like to express its sincere gratitude and appreciation to all Ukrainian human rights defenders, lawyers, and legal experts for sharing their invaluable insights with us. We are especially thankful to ZMINA human rights center, the Media Initiative for Human Rights, Ukrainian Legal Advisory Group, and the Centre for Civil Liberties, for their generous contribution of knowledge and expertise.

Finally, Human Rights Watch is profoundly thankful to all Ukrainians who agreed to speak with us and shared their experiences.